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BEYOND THE MAGINOT LINE: THE REAL
BORDERS OF FREEDOM AND SECURITY
US-CANADIAN SECURITY RELATIONS CONFERENCE
PANEL 1: BORDER ISSUES US-CANADIAN BORDER RELATIONS:
PARTNERSHIP OR PREDICAMENT
Hugh Segal*
MY purpose in this presentation is not to bring new expertise to
the challenges of border management. There are others here
who, on this panel and others, can add immeasurably more to
that aspect of our discussions. I intend, instead to suggest that in spite of
the outstanding and hard nitty-gritty work done on border management
by both governments, and by the private sector - reflecting extraordinary
accomplishment in a relatively brief time frame, or, perhaps because of
all that has been accomplished, it is time to think hard about whether we
are understanding the border issue in its full dimension.
I understand and accept that the Border has become a key measure of
the battle against terrorism in both countries. Relative to what Canada's
general stance should be on anti-terrorism engagement I am attracted by
what Andrew Richter of University of Windsor, wrote in the recent Dal-
housie Centre for Foreign Policy monograph entitled "Independence in
an Age of Empire." In an article entitled, "The Invisible Country" Pro-
fessor Richter put it this way on page 265: "In the present war on terror-
ism I believe that Canada should co-operate with the United States
because it is the right thing to do. Canada, like the United States is a
potential target of terrorists, something that the Canadian government
would prefer Canadians not think about (even if terrorists have shown no
similar unwillingness). Groups like Al Qaeda despise Canada almost as
much as they hate the U.S. Canada stands for everything such groups
abhor: free people making free choices, in a secular state where women
have equal rights to men.
It is time that Canada's political leaders understood that fact, and it is
similarly time for Canada's citizens to realize that this is not a war of
radical Islam against the U.S. It is a war that pits democratic and secular
peoples against those who do everything in their power to kill them. Ca-
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nada has no choice regarding which side it is on in this conflict, and the
sooner Canadians understand that fact, the more likely it is we will begin
to reclaim some of the international standing we have most recently lost."
That being said, I want to raise with you my concern about how we
view and understand the border challenge. The Maginot line of fortifica-
tion built from the Swiss border to the Belgian, and, named, unhappily
for him, for Andre Maginot, who was France's Minister of War from
1929-1932, was built to be impregnable, was never finished, and was not
complete by the outbreak of new hostilities in 1939. It was designed to
respond to the technologies and battle plans of the 1914 war. It was ut-
terly useless in the face of the Nazi blitzkrieg of 1939. 7 billion Francs
were invested in the line. It had three interdependent fortified belts with
anti-tank emplacements and pillboxes. Rommel and Van Rundstedt went
through the heavily wooded and semi mountainous areas of the Arden
and evaded the line completely.
There has been increased funding of at least thirty billion US dollars to
the Department of Homeland Security since 2001. A host of new pro-
grams have been constructively put into place by Canada and the United
States, aimed at tracking and apprehending the guilty, or those with per-
sonal patterns that reflect greater terrorist risk, while expediting the
trans-border movement of the assumed innocent, the honorable and
where possible the pre -cleared, pre-filed, or pre-inspected and certified.
Canada has created a new Canada Border Services Agency, on Decem-
ber 12, 2003 as part of the new portfolio of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness. The new agency will be responsible for 75 different laws,
including customs, intelligence, and enforcement from Citizenship and
Immigration, and Import Inspection at Points of Entry from Canada's
Food Inspection Agency. In the immediate post 9-11 federal budget in
Canada, then Finance Minister Martin approved eight billion new dollars
for various aspects of security.
There are roughly two hundred million travelers who cross the Canada-
US border every year. All of the above invites us to ask some serious
questions about border infrastructure and what the real protections are
against the random mass murder of our residents by terrorists. And to
assess the extent to which the Border focus may be an unwitting focus on
the most convenient as opposed to the most salient points of our real
vulnerability. Let me connect for a moment a core defense theory and a
compelling aspect of human nature:
A. It is always better, according to conventional defense theory, to
fight the enemy as far away from home as humanly possible. A par-
tial victory or defeat abroad is always better than a successful en-
gagement at home - because the latter will cost innocent civilian
lives at home- the least acceptable defense option as long as any
other option exists.
B. Threats to any institution are always externalized. University
presidents blame governments for internal financial pressures, inves-
tors blame regulators, public health officials blame far away sources
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of virulent infections, unions blame greedy employers, shareholders
blame management, families blame schools, unhappy wives blame
mistresses. It is part of our culture that danger and risk come from
elsewhere, and can or should be kept away and be dealt with in that
fashion.
Both these conceptual and psychological realties can be seen over our
collective history. Calling a deployed military force an "Expeditionary
Force" reflects the popularity of sending troops "over there" to confront,
contain, or eradicate a risk - "over there" being the very real opposite of
"over here." Songs like "Over There," or "It's a Long Way to Tipper-
ary," or "We're Going to Hang Out the Washing on the Zigfreed Line,"
all speak to the deep need people have to know that there are barriers of
space, time, and friendly troops and forces between the "problem". or the
"threat" and where they spend their daily private and public workplace
lives.
As democracies require trust to work, and as trust is tied to confidence,
democratically elected politicians on both sides of the border have a real
and understandable interest, not detached from the public interest to be
seen to be investing in efforts abroad and at the border to keep the risk
and threat contained. (not to mention the interest that congressional
members from border districts have in more jobs and investment in their
district) What possible other option could democratic leaders and public
servants have? Yet, it is at conferences like this, and in think tanks and
research centres everywhere, where we need to ask some thoughtful
questions about the underlying principles and assumptions here. Let me
refer to this thematic of questions as the Maginot Line of Inquiry.
I.
Why do we believe that terrorists will choose our most fortified, heavily
prepared and data linked infrastructures at the border as their desired
means of entry? What is it about terrorists and their practices to date that
would lead us to that conclusion?
II.
We know from various published documents that to the extent there
are explicit terrorist plans, harming Americans, Jews, Israelis, and all
other citizens of those countries engaged in the war on terrorism in Iraq
or Afghanistan, in the greatest possible numbers in places of maximum
exposure and least protection is very much the desired outcome. If one
talks to people who live in countries regularly faced with terrorist mass
murder of civilian and essentially innocent populations, this terrorist tac-
tic is, however repugnant and barbaric, quite predictable. Making people
fearful of every school bus, open air caf6, discotheque, restaurant, univer-
sity campus, or downtown square, eats quickly away at confidence, trust,
cooperation, and common cause. Fear is the terrorists' short term goal.
Panic is the higher dimension of that fear; despair is the medium term
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result most helpful to the nihilist worldview the terrorist has taken. The
idea of a border,-between a good country and bad, between innocent ci-
vilian and enemy combatant is, by all assessment, utterly irrelevant to the
terrorist.
III.
The asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat is about the opposite of
land, sea, and air borders. It is about first and foremost, destroying the
border between civility and mayhem, between sane private lives in civil
societies, and random death, mutilation, pain, and carnage - the more
random and horrific, the better. People jumping from burning buildings,
body parts strewn hither and yawn, children killed on the way to school,
these are all victories for the terrorist planning framework. Terrorists
rarely have prison records. They usually commit one barbaric and hei-
nous mass murdering crime. Asymmetry means precisely that - the de-
nial of any balanced or logical proportions, the absence of balance or
harmony; borders are about the organized application of rules, proce-
dures, principles, judgment, and human intuition to find and address risks
that have attributes associated with risk in the past.
IV.
The real front line, the real border that truly matters, is the border in
our day to day life between the civility and predictably of a life without
fear or intimidation, and death, mass murder, and systemic panic. The
front line is not an isolated border crossing near Lacolle, Quebec, or be-
tween Montana and Alberta. The real front line is where we live, work,
and relax in our great cities and communities. That front line is not of
our choosing. Those who blew up innocent commuters in Madrid, those
who killed thousands in New York and Washington, those who blew up
buses and Pizzerias in Israel, clubs in Bali, and the rest, it is they who
chose that front line. Doing all we can to move the front line back to our
borders, airports, seaports, sealanes, and terrorist recruitment and coales-
cence spots around the world is worthwhile and vital. Why would we
conclude, and on the basis of what evidence, that it is sufficient? It is both
unavoidable and natural that a civilized society would want to have some
sort of "checkpoint Charlie" between itself and the terrorist threat. It is,
unclear that evidence supports the viability of this concept, however com-
forting it may be.
V.
Clearly, and for good reason, airport security in North America has
been increased. In Canada, evidence of stricter standards, better and
more thorough scanning equipment and more uniform training are evi-
dent. The core question, which existed well before Madrid is whether
enhanced airport security obviates security at office towers, department
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stores, shopping malls, railway stations, theatres, and large crowd venues
generally? With airports better protected, and with terrorist target prefer-
ences clearly stated, are we really "at war" with terrorists if other large
crowd venues are unprotected or only sporadically protected? Are we
invested in one border infrastructure while avoiding the border between
civil society and terror that may well matter as much if not more?
VI.
In the end, security and freedom is about far more than territorial bor-
ders - even though, territorial borders may be among the most compel-
ling government concerns on this issue. We know that disease,
environmental risk, criminal networks, drugs, illegal arms, financial fraud
and money laundering are essentially undeterred by borders. Why would
we rationally conclude that terrorism is deterred? In Canada, the Cana-
dian Security and Intelligence Service has long reported and certainly
well before the tragedy of 9- 11, the existence of terrorist related groups
connected to conflict around the world - including the Israeli- Palestinian
conflict as well as those in Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Afghanistan, Lebanon,
Northern Ireland, the Punjab, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the former Yugo-
slavia. There is little reason to believe that the presence of similar groups
is in any way less meaningful in the United States, or Western Europe.
VII.
Has the old adage that if "all you have is a hammer, then every prob-
lem looks like a nail" determined, at least in part, the nature of govern-
ment response to the terrorist threat? Is the pre-existence of border
infrastructure the most compelling reason for the continued intensity of
focus on that infrastructure? Is the investment in the border (which I
heartily encourage and support) a strategic and tactical response to the
real nature of the threat - or a response that is the least likely to inconve-
nience domestic populations where they work, live and congregate?
VIII.
An old economics professor of mine, now a senior official at the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa was speaking at a session on
"Governing in a World Without Borders" sponsored by the IRPP in Oc-
tober of 2001 at Montebello outside of Ottawa. While the conference
itself was planned long before 9-11, and focused explicitly on how sover-
eignties were being shared and transferred in a range of international
agreements, we did have one evening long session on the implication of 9-
11 as they were knowable at that time. Those present included public
servants, scholars, former politicians, journalists, and private sector lead-
ership. The D.F.A. official phrased his concern this way: "When 'just in
time' becomes 'just in case' at the US/Canada border, Canada has a huge
problem. So, while genuine security and protective screening is the pri-
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mary purpose of investment in border infrastructure, on both sides, for
Canada, doing what is necessary in security terms to keep open the eco-
nomic thoroughfares that proceed through the border is of compelling
interest. While showing Americans that Canadians are doing their part
so as to forestall the ultimate sanction of a closed or severely constrained
border is vital, one should not assume that it is coincident with the real
application of investment at those places in society where citizens are
most vulnerable. Security must be about security. If it is perceived as
being about doing what is necessary to promote trade, with trade being
the key goal, then it is not surprising that due diligence concerns about
real security outcomes tend to materialize.
Ix.
Also, in the category of "hammers making all problems into nails" is
the cost to new organizational structures and legislation. The largest ter-
rorist attack in Canada caused the death of more than three hundred pas-
sengers, mostly Canadians, on an Air India flight from Toronto in 1985.
Its alleged organizer is just at trial as we speak. That event brought about
no reorganization of airport security or new anti -terrorist legislation. We
are now in the throws of significant reorganization, since the swearing in
of the Martin administration in December 2003. The events of 9-11 pro-
duced significant other reorganization and the creation of new agencies
on both sides of the border. If there is a direct relationship between cre-
ating new departments and apprehending more terrorists, it is at least
empirically unproven. What we do know is that reorganization is finan-
cially costly, saps internal energy, and eats up management time. Both
the US and Canada are deeply into this operational mode. Without quib-
bling about sincere and good faith efforts up to this point, should we not
ask whether perpetual reorganization makes compelling sense going for-
ward? If we invested reorganization dollars into screening at arenas, of-
fice towers, large theatres, public transit, and malls - where huge
numbers of vulnerable citizens gather daily - would we not be doing
more that really mattered?
X.
While it is politically attractive to talk about America or Canada being
under attack by terrorists, the hard truth is that terrorists have not put
our armed forces, border patrols, or police in their cross hairs. It is our
civilian population that is the target. So the border that matters, essen-
tially, is the one between each citizen and that risk of random violence.
These are the real borders that protect freedom and security. They are
not exclusively found at the 49th parallel. They are found, these real bor-
ders, at railway stations, hospitals, ferries, bridges, transit terminals, are-
nas, large hotels, malls, and the like. No intensity of infrastructure at our
borders, no plethora of pre -clearance, manifest pre -transmission,
gamma ray inspection, at ports can make up for the absence of infrastruc-
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ture at the public gathering place and private vulnerability points that
matter.
CONCLUSION
The massive investment of money, time, and technology by govern-
ments, civil servants, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector at
our borders is driven by a mix of security and economic considerations; it
is laudable and reflective of the best in cooperation between two allies.
The belief that national border infrastructure can protect against real
vulnerability in local high-density locations is unfounded; most security
agencies would agree that it is only one part of the answer. Security is
about keeping people safe from violence and random terrorist acts. It is
not about economic flows. For my government to justify security invest-
ment at the border in terms of economic access is to deny the hard reality
that for Americans security is about security, not about economics.
Ambassador Celucci made it clear at an IRPP breakfast last year-"Se-
curity trumps Trade." If along with the twin Towers, BCE Place in To-
ronto or the Place Ville Marie had been attacked killing innocent
thousands, Canadians would feel precisely the same. A Maginot line be-
lief in the national prophylactic capacity of borders is likely both a com-
pelling conceit and a mixture of prayer and wishful thinking. We need to
become brutally and publicly honest about the less than causal relation-
ship between departmental reorganization and border infrastructure, and
real public security in public places that face asymmetrical risks from de-
tached terrorist networks.
If we are "at war with terrorism," as we should be, we cannot wage that
war without some public inconvenience. The intensification of border
presence and screening, the creation of new programs and infrastructure
will be hollow and pyrrhic gains if we have not engaged our communities
to protect public places and systems where citizens actually live, work,
and commute. The national border deserves support and modernization.
That cannot take place at the expense of the real border between civility
and panic, the border that protects the average citizen in their day to day
lives.
The security arrangements between our two countries are about more
than borders. Co-operation between agencies in our two countries is at
an all time high. The linkage between local first responders and local and
preventive capacity has never mattered more. Some will no doubt argue
that to impose random bag checks, wanding, metal detectors across the
full range of public venues would be to impose undue inconvenience on
the residents of our two countries. I understand that argument but argue
that we must set it aside. Inconvenience is not tantamount to the abroga-
tion of human rights or civil liberties. We are subjected to hundreds of
process inconveniences everyday that have little to do with security. The
borders that matter are close at hand. They are part of our everyday
lives. And these are the borders that must be strengthened.
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